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AI Goes to School—Implications for
School District Liability
HAROLD J. KRENT†
JOHN ETCHINGHAM††
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KATHARINE PANCEWICZ††††
School districts increasingly and controversially require
students to use school-provided technology that tracks every
sentence students write and every website students visit,
whether from school or at home.1 Although the pedagogic
advantages are many, the privacy concerns are profound
given the pervasive information at the fingertips of teachers
and school administrators.2 As students increasingly use the
† Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
†† JD Class of 2020.
††† JD Class of 2020.
†††† JD Class of 2020.
1. Alexandra Chachkevitch, Privacy Concerns Arise Over Monitoring
Software, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Feb. 27, 2014), https://www.chicagotribune.com/
suburbs/glenview/ct-xpm-2014-02-27-ct-schools-monitoring-software-tl-n20140227-story.html. The software tracks students’ navigation as long as the
student uses school-provided hardware or signs in through the school portal.
2. Frida Alim, Nate Cardozo, Gennie Gebhart, Karen Gullo & Amul Kalia,
Spying on Students: School-Issued Devices and Student Privacy, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Apr. 13, 2017). Some parents have lashed back at the
increased focus on online initiatives, fearing that their children use the Web
excessively as it is. See, e.g., Nellie Bowles, Silicon Valley Came to Kansas
Schools. That Started a Rebellion, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2019).
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Internet,3 the most intimate details of their lives are exposed
to school officials.
Because of the vast information now at school
administrators’ fingertips, schools have turned to technology
companies to install software—termed safety management
platforms (SMPs)—that alert school districts to risks of
suicide or bullying.4 The software uses Artificial Intelligence
(AI) to comb through a student’s word usage and online
navigation to notify school administrators of concerns
warranting intervention.5 Indeed, the third-party providers
boast that their technology is essential to preventing
violence.6 For instance, a leading SMP, Bark for Schools,
recently asserted that its combination of technology and
process had thwarted “16 plausible school shootings” in the
preceding year.7 Another market leader, Gaggle, claims “to
have stopped 447 deaths by suicide” between July 2018 and
February 2019.8 Not surprisingly, school districts have
flocked to adopt the technology. As of February 2019,

3. Marielle Gilbert, 4 Ways to Protect Kids from Cyberbulling, GOGUARDIAN
BLOG (Oct. 2, 2017), https://blog.goguardian.com/4-ways-to-protect-kids-fromcyberbullying.
4. Simone Stolzoff, Schools are Using AI to Track What Students Write on
Their Computers, QUARTZ (Aug. 19, 2018), https://qz.com/1318758/schools-areusing-ai-to-track-what-students-write-on-their-computers/. Some schools may
adopt the technology as well in an effort to comply with the Children’s Internet
Protection Act (CIPA), which requires schools and libraries to certify that they
have an Internet safety policy that includes technology protection measures. The
protection measures must block or filter access to pictures that are (a) obscene;
(b) child pornography; or (c) harmful to minors.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Larry Magid, School Software Walks the Line Between Safety
Monitor and “Parent Over the Shoulder,” FORBES (Apr. 14, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymagid/2016/04/14/straddling-the-line-between
-spying-and-protecting-students/#69847327df93 (reporting on GoGuardian’s
assertions of prowess).
7. Edward C. Baig, Can Artificial Intelligence Prevent the Next Parkland
Shooting?, USA TODAY (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/
2019/02/13/preventing-next-parkland-artificial-intelligence-may-help/
2801369002/.
8. Id.
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approximately 4,500 school districts deploy one of three
SMPs—Securly, Gaggle, and Bark for Schools.9 School
districts rely on SMPs to keep students safe.10
Lost in the shuffle has been the potential impact on
school liability if a tragedy ensues. Traditionally, immunity
doctrines under state law (and restrictive Section 1983
jurisprudence under federal law) have protected school
districts from liability in all but the most shocking cases. On
the one hand, school districts will likely avoid liability if they
follow the protocols suggested by the SMPs. On the other,
however, school districts may be liable if they fail to act on
the alerts provided by the third-party software provider, for
that omission will likely be considered ministerial and open
the schools to liability. Moreover, utilization of an SMP may
lull students and their parents into taking fewer precautions.
This might lead courts to hold school districts liable for
failing to warn of dangers of which the districts should have
been aware. Finally, as the efficacy of SMPs increases and
the cost decreases, a public school might be liable for failing
to use an SMP.
Part I traces the development and functionality of the
safety management platforms in question. Part II then
canvasses the doctrines that have emerged exposing school
districts to limited liability for failing to protect children. As
the basis for liability has shifted from custody to special
relationship between a school and its students, the scope of
liability has broadened. In Part III, we argue that utilization
of SMPs will protect school districts when they adhere to the
warnings indicated by the SMP. But if a school district
ignores the SMP’s alert, then the school district opens itself
to liability because a failure to act on concrete alerts will be
considered ministerial. And, as SMPs become the norm, a
9. Baig, supra note 7 (stating a combined total of approximately 2,000 school
districts use Securly, 1,400 use Gaggle, and 1,100 use Bark for Schools).
10. Rebecca Sadwick, Why Aren’t Schools Doing More to Prevent Suicide?,
FORBES (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rebeccasadwick/2015/09/
10/why-arent-schools-doing-more-to-prevent-suicide/#19fce02c4727.
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failure to use an SMP may itself fall beneath a standard of
reasonable care. Finally, in Part IV, we conclude that, for the
most part, schools will escape liability for failing to
sufficiently supervise the technology company utilizing the
SMP, but schools should take care to treat such companies
as independent contractors.
I.

FUNCTIONALITY OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT PLATFORMS

Contemporary K-12 classroom technologies11 empower
teachers to track a student’s academic progress on homework
assignments and observe a student’s behavior online.12 Much
of the software allows the school not only to monitor
computer use at school, but also at home.13
Given the potential intrusiveness of such software,
schools have turned to Safety Management Platforms to
monitor students’ online activity for suicidal behaviors,
cyberbullying, and other threats of violence. To prevent such
harm, SMPs typically use “natural-language processing to
scan through the millions of words typed on . . . computers”—
school or personal—as long as the student uses schoolsupplied hardware or signs in through the school portal.14
When the technology flags a concerning word or phrase, a
team of human reviewers working on behalf of the
technology companies evaluates the severity of the flagged

11. See, e.g., Ben Cahoon, Choosing the Right Classroom Management
Software Solution, SOUTHEAST EDUCATION NETWORK (Mar. 21, 2011),
https://www.seenmagazine.us/Articles/Article-Detail/articleid/1332/choosingthe-right-classroom-management-software-solution.
12. See id.
13. Anya Kamenetz, Software Flags ‘Suicidal’ Students, Presenting Privacy
Dilemma, NPRED (March 28, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/03/28/
470840270/when-school-installed-software-stops-a-suicide; Cody Walker, How
Our District Uses Tech to Fight Cyberbullying, ESCHOOL NEWS (Oct. 18, 2018),
https://www.eschoolnews.com/2018/10/18/how-our-district-uses-tech-to-fightcyberbullying. Impero Education Pro allows teachers and other school officials to
go back and pull up screenshots and time stamped videos of students’ online
activity, regardless of when that online activity occurred.
14. Stolzoff, supra note 4.
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material.15 If the human reviewers determine that the
indication meets certain requirements—requirements
typically known only to the technology company itself—the
company will alert school personnel.16 The functionality of
different SMPs varies slightly,17 but this general approach
remains the same across platforms.
School districts typically work with the technology
company to tailor the software to their specific needs—
selecting which words and phrases will be considered
“language of harm.”18 For instance, gang nicknames vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as does slang for particular
drugs. Moreover, schools have experienced different
histories, whether shootings or suicides, that should be
factored in.19 Overall, SMPs are seen as a vital way of
preventing harm before it happens, especially in an era in
which school shootings, student suicides, bullying, and
depression are on the rise.20
A. Suicide Alerts
SMPs that monitor for suicide ideation and planning
15. See id.; see also Bark for Schools, BARK, https://www.bark.us/schools.
16. See Stolzoff, supra note 4; see also Gaggle Safety Management, GAGGLE,
https://www.gaggle.net/product/gaggle-safety-management/.
17. For example, platforms like Gaggle, Bark for Schools, and Securly use
humans as a line of first review in determining which alerts merit sharing with
school personnel, while platforms like GoGuardian, Beacon, and Social Sentinel
rely only on the technology itself. See, e.g., Gaggle Safety Management, supra note
16; see also Bark for Schools, supra note 15; 24 by Securly, SECURLY,
https://www.securly.com/products/24; Go Guardian Beacon, GOGUARDIAN,
https://www.goguardian.com/beacon.html; One Central Platform, SOCIAL
SENTINEL, https://www.socialsentinel.com/one-central-platform/.
18. Lisa Mullins, To Detect Threats and Prevent Suicides, Schools Pay
Company to Scan Social Media Posts, WBUR NEWS (March 22, 2018),
https://www.wbur.org/news/2018/03/22/school-threats-suicide-prevention-tech.
19. See Eli Zimmerman, GoGuardian Develops a New AI-Enabled Cloud
Filter
for
K-12
Schools,
EDTECH MAGAZINE
(Feb.
11,
2019),
https://edtechmagazine.com/k12/article/2019/02/goguardian-develops-new-aienabled-cloud-filter-k-12-schools.
20. Stolzoff, supra note 4.
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advertise themselves as a response to the reality that suicide
is now the second-leading cause of death among teenagers.21
Since 2007, the suicide rate has increased thirty percent for
boys and has doubled for girls ages fifteen to nineteen.22
To provide one example, GoGuardian’s newest product,
Beacon, alerts school officials and parents to students at risk
of committing suicide.23 GoGuardian prides itself on having
developed the K–12 software with mental health and suicide
prevention experts, such as the American Foundation for
Suicide Prevention and the American Association of
Suicidology.24 Like other SMPs, Beacon scans for certain
words, phrases, and content. Beacon relies on school districts
to tailor the software to their specific needs,25 and school
districts choose who gets the alerts and how alerts are
created.26
Although data from Beacon indicate that eighty percent
of at-risk notifications were generated during school hours,
the software does not stop at the classroom.27 Beacon
conducts real-time scans across the entire internet and
continues to scan even after the student goes home and uses
a personal device.28 The software’s cloud-based capability
allows it to scan all mobile and personal devices connected to
21. Brian Resnick, A Promising New Clue to Prevent Teen Suicide: Empower
Adults Who Care, VOX (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/
2019/2/28/18234667/teen-suicide-prevention.
22. GoGuardian Announces Beacon, a Suicide and Self-Harm Prevention Tool
for Schools, BUSINESS WIRE (August 27, 2018), https://www.businesswire.com/
news/home/20180827005160/en/GoGuardian-Announces-Beacon-Suicide-SelfHarm-Prevention-Tool [hereinafter GoGuardian Announces Beacon].
23. GoGuardian, GoGuardian Launches New Suicide Prevention Technology
Allowing Schools to Help At-Risk Students, AMERICAN FOUNDATION FOR SUICIDE
PREVENTION, https://afsp.org/goguardian-launches-new-suicide-preventiontechnology-allowing-schools-to-help-at-risk-students/.
24. Id.
25. Kamenetz, supra note 13.
26. See GoGuardian Announces Beacon, supra note 22.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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school networks.29 The software also monitors chat, social
media, and emails 24/7.30 The company advertises the
benefits of expansive monitoring to permit schools to identify
warning signs that other services might miss by scanning
only school-provided devices.31
Beacon also advertises that it has fewer false positives
because the software separates the student’s online activity
into “phases.”32 First, the software monitors students’ online
activity and devices for behavior indicative of suicide
ideation and self-harm.33 Second, the software creates an
alert of concerning activity34 and notifies designated
recipients, including school officials, parents and students.35
The alerts can escalate until action is taken, and the alerts
can occur at any time.36 The student can also be messaged
directly with suicide help and prevention resources.37
B. Bullying and Threats of Violence
In addition to teen suicide, SMPs also address the
nationwide concern for bullying in schools.38 Bullying ranks
among the top worries of parents and students, and takes
place in all schools.39 In 2017 alone, over thirteen million
American children were bullied or cyberbullied.40 According
29. Zimmerman, supra note 19.
30. GoGuardian Announces Beacon, supra note 22.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. Mary Ann Azevedo, New Apps Aim to Deter, Stop Bullying, CISCO: THE
NETWORK (May 21, 2015), https://newsroom.cisco.com/feature-content?article
Id=1630360.
39. Id.
40. Tina Meier, AI Technology Helps Protect Teens from Cyberbullying, IBM
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to the National Center for Education Statistics, one out of
every five children in grades six through twelve reported that
they had been bullied,41 and the impact may be more
severe.42 Along with its suicide prevention tools, GoGuardian
has Smart Alert.43 Smart Alert monitors online behavior and
alerts administrators when students are “victimized
online.”44 Different software allows the alerts to be triggered
when students use certain language online if a student is
bullying another or if a student is being bullied.45 Once
again, school districts can tailor the software to a school
district’s specific needs.46
Impero Education Pro incorporates monitoring software
into its classroom management software.47 As do the other
software providers, Impero identifies keywords and phrases
that presage cyberbullying or threats of violence.48 The
software then sends an alert to the proper staff when it
detects a student typing those words or phrases, or even if
the student accesses websites often used for cyberbullying or
violence.49 The classroom management software allows
school officials to identify students involved in the
situation.50 The screen shots generated by the SMPs can also
(Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/client-voices/ai-technology-protectteens-cyberbullying/.
41. Deborah Lessne & Christina Yanez, Student Reports of Bullying: Results
from the 2015 School Crime Supplement to the National Crime Victimization
Survery. Web Tables. NCES 2017-015, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION
STATISTICS (Dec. 20, 2016), https://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid
=2017015.
42. Ari E. Waldman, Tormented: Anti-Gay Bullying in Schools, 84 TEMP. L.
REV. 385, 399 (2012).
43. Gilbert, supra note 3.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. Walker, supra note 13.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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be shared with the proper administrators, parents, and even
authorities.51
Social Sentinel is another one of the many technology
companies that offer some form of social media scanning or
monitoring.52 The software scans social media posts across
dozens of social media platforms every day. Social Sentinel
also works with mental health and public safety experts to
build a “library” of possible harmful words and phrases for
school districts to choose from.53 School districts principally
deploy Social Sentinel to pick up threats of violence, but the
software also scans social media posts for indications that a
student might hurt him or herself.54
Some software not only monitors for bullying and
violence, but also prompts students to prevent such behavior.
For example, Gaggle includes a feature called the SpeakUp
Timeline, which allows students to report bullying, fights,
threats of violence, and more.55 The email address for
SpeakUp will automatically populate in the address box any
time a student starts composing an email on G Suite or Office
365.56 Trained officials then evaluate the reports to filter out
false positives. School officials and law enforcement are
contacted in emergency situations.57 Securly also features a
Tipline, where students can send in anonymous tips that are
later analyzed by professionals.58
In short, SMPs utilize AI to identify students at risk of
suicide, bullying and other violence. SMPs alert school
administrators to the need to intervene to prevent the harm.

51. Id.
52. Mullins, supra note 18.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. SpeakUp, GAGGLE, https://www.gaggle.net/product/safetytipline/.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. TipLine, SECURLY, https://www.securly.com/products/tipline.
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II. SCHOOL DISTRICT DUTY TO PROTECT
A. Custody Theory
Courts have long imposed on schools a duty to protect
students in their charge: “The duty owed derive[d] from the
simple fact that a school, in assuming physical custody and
control over its students, effectively takes the place of
parents and guardians.”59 Given that schools have custody of
students for at least part of the day, courts reasoned that
schools must take care that no harm befell students for that
period of custody. Just as schools had to ensure that students
were not harmed by slippery floors or debris on stairs,60 they
had a duty to protect the students from harm from others or
their own employees on the premises.61
At the same time, courts placed significant limitations
on the school’s duty. As the New York court summarized in

59. Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44, 49 (1994).
60. Perkins v. Norwood City Schs., 707 N.E.2d 868, 870 (Ohio 1998); Cooper
v. Smithtown Cent. Sch. Dists., 441 N.Y.S.2d 552, 553 (1981).
61. With respect to federal law, the custody question loomed large in a variety
of civil rights lawsuits alleging that school districts’ failure to protect students
violated the Due Process Clause. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department
of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 198 (1989), the United States Supreme Court
rejected a Section 1983 claim based on the social service department’s failure to
intervene to protect plaintiff’s son from serious abuse by the custodial father. The
Court recognized the gravity of the harm but held that the government’s failure
to protect against private violence does not constitute a denial of due process
unless the state exercised custody over the individual or somehow had created or
amplified the risk. Id. at 202. Liability, however, can arise if state actors have
near total custody of individuals, as in a prison or orphanage, or when the state
actors themselves caused the peril. Id. at 200. To the Court, custody was the
lynchpin, not a special relationship per se. Id. at 201. Following DeShaney, the
Seventh Circuit in J.O. Alton Community Unit School District, 909 F.2d 267, 272
(7th Cir. 1990), held that the limited custody exercised by the school did not
create an affirmative duty to protect, and the Third Circuit held similarly in D.R.
v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 972 F.2d 1364, 1371 (3d Cir.
1992). According to the Third Circuit, “parents remain the primary caretakers,
despite [students’] presence in school.” D.R., 972 F.2d at 1371. State attendance
laws were insufficient to impose such a duty upon the schools. Parents could
remove the children from school or talk to their students about taking steps at
school to avert the harm. Id.
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Carabello v. New York City Dept. of Educ.,62 “the imposition
of this duty d[id] not make schools insurers of the safety of
their students, ‘for they [could not] be reasonably expected to
continuously supervise and control all movements and
activities of students.’”63 Because schools cannot ensure the
safety of students in the hallways, locker room, and in the
school yard, courts generally administered a heightened
foreseeability standard before they imposed liability in the
school context for harm at the hands of others—whether
students, teachers, or staff. This heightened standard
required the school to possess “sufficiently specific
knowledge or [actual or constructive] notice of the dangerous
conduct which caused the injury; that is, that the third-party
acts could reasonably have been anticipated.”64 And, the
custodial origin of a school’s historical duty—the duty’s
foundation, for lack of a better term—led courts to limit
school liability to foreseeable injuries that occurred on school
premises. Unless the school released the student into “a
potentially hazardous situation, particularly when the
hazard [was] partly of the school district’s own making,” the
school’s duty ended when the school relinquished custody of
the student.65
To illustrate these limitations, consider the New York
Court of Appeals’ decision in Stephenson v. City of New
York.66 There, two eighth-grade students were suspended

62. 928 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
63. Id. at 646.
64. Mirand, 84 N.Y.2d at 49. Under a different formulation of the same
concept, Wisconsin courts hold that no immunity exists where “public officers or
employees” breach “ministerial duties” that arise from “known and compelling
dangers.” Voss ex rel. Harrison v. Elkhorn Area Sch. Dist., 724 N.W.2d 420, 423
(Wisc. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).
65. Ernest v. Red Creek Cent. Sch. Dist., 93 N.Y.2d 664, 671 (1999); see also
Pratt v. Robinson, 39 N.Y.2d 554, 560 (1976) (“When [the school’s] custody ceases
because the child has passed out of the orbit of its authority in such a way that
the parent is perfectly free to reassume control over the child’s protection, the
school’s custodial duty also ceases.”).
66. 19 N.Y.3d 1031, 1032 (2012).
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from school for their involvement in an altercation at school
on October 22.67 Two days later, on October 24th, one of the
students assaulted the other student two blocks from the
school prior to school hours.68 The assaulted student’s
mother sued school officials, alleging that school officials
failed to ensure the student’s safety during the October 24th
assault.69 The defendant school officials then moved to
dismiss the claim, arguing that school officials owed no duty
related to the second altercation because the altercation took
place before school hours and off school property.70 After the
lower court originally denied the school officials’ motion, New
York’s highest court affirmed the Appellate Division’s
decision to dismiss the case.71 The court found that “the
school addressed the [first] altercation that occurred on
school property . . . by punishing the students” and that the
second altercation “was out of the orbit of the school’s
authority, as the incident occurred away from the school and
before school hours where there was no teacher
supervision.”72
Similarly, in Matallana v. School Board of Miami-Dade
County,73 the Florida court held that a school could not be
responsible for violence outside school premises. The
decedent informed the school guard that someone wanted to
fight him, and soon after the student left school, he was
attacked and tragically died. Even though the security guard
breached protocol by failing to report the information, the
court reiterated that “a school’s obligation of reasonable

67. Id. at 1033.
68. Id. at 1032.
69. Id. at 1033. See also Searcy v. Hemet Unified Sch. Dist., 223 Cal. Rptr.
206, 213 (1986) (finding that school responsibility ends “when a student had
departed homeward after school hours”).
70. Stephenson, 19 N.Y.3d at 1033.
71. Id. at 1033.
72. Id. at 1034.
73. 838 So.2d 1191, 1192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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supervision must come to an end and the parent or
guardian’s duty of supervision must resume . . . when the
student leaves the school’s premises during non-school hours
and is no longer involved in school-related activities.”74 The
custody theory of liability prevailed.75
Even when an injury occurs on school premises, state law
immunity poses a high hurdle for those challenging
supervision and other discretionary acts by public schools.
Some of the immunity is statutory, and some is based on
common law.76 Although immunity doctrines vary, the
doctrine typically immunizes school districts from liability
for discretionary actions—actions “involving the exercise of
discretion and judgment, or personal deliberation, decision,
and judgment.”77 However, schools can still be held
accountable for injuries stemming from ministerial acts—
actions “requiring only obedience to the orders of others, or
when the officer’s duty is absolute, certain and imperative,
involving merely execution of a specific act arising from fixed
and designated facts.”78 And schools may be held liable even
for discretionary actions if those actions reflect willful and
wanton conduct. But, for judgment calls, the public
immunity doctrine blocks liability. As the court summarized
in Coe v. Board of Educ. of Town of Watertown,79 “[t]he

74. Id. (citation omitted).
75. See also Colette v. Tolleson Unified Sch. Dist. No. 21, 54 P.3d 828, 832
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (holding school not liable for crash involving students during
school hours even though school officials were negligent in allowing students to
leave the school).
76. See Peter J. Maher et al., Governmental and Official Immunity for School
Districts and Their Employees: Alive & Well?, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 234,
242–43 (2010) (assessing immunity state by state and concluding that some form
of immunity exists in all states); see also KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID
ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 531–35 (Chris Thillen ed., 3d ed.
1992).
77. James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 905 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002) (quotations
removed); see also Coe v. Bd. of Educ., 19 A.3d 640, 643 (Conn. 2011).
78. James, 95 S.W.3d at 905 (quotations removed).
79. 19 A.3d at 643.
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hallmark of a discretionary act is that it requires the exercise
of judgment . . . . In contrast, [m]inisterial refers to a duty
which is to be performed in a prescribed manner without the
exercise of judgment or discretion.”80 In short, the judgment
of school administrators as to when students should be
protected from themselves or others is highly discretionary—
teachers and school administrators are not experts in
preventing violence to others or selves, and their
determinations as to whether and how to intervene if
threatening behavior comes to their attention has been
considered discretionary.
As an example, consider Brandy B. v. Eden Central
School District.81 There, the mother of a five-year-old girl
sued the girl’s school district after an eleven-year-old boy
sexually assaulted the girl on a school bus.82 The plaintiff
mother alleged inadequate supervision against the
defendant school district.83 In support of the claim, the
plaintiff produced evidence of the boy’s “troubling history” of
“‘verbal aggression, aggression towards himself and others,
threats with weapons, fire setting, hyperactivity,
impulsivity, auditory hallucinations, history of stealing,
temper tantrums, poor peer relations, academic problems,
and history of suicidal injurious ideations.’”84 The plaintiff
had even complained to the school bus driver about the boy
after receiving “some notice . . . of inappropriate interactions
between the two children.”85 Faced with this evidence, the
court nonetheless held that “the alleged sexual assault . . .
was an unforeseeable act that, without sufficiently specific
knowledge or notice, could not have been reasonably

80. Id.
81. 934 N.E.2d 304, 305 (N.Y. 2010).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 306.
84. Id. at 305.
85. Id. at 306.
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anticipated by the school district.”86 Thus, despite the boy’s
behavioral history and the mother’s previous complaints, the
court determined that the decision whether to take
protective measures remained in the school’s discretion.87
B. Special Relationship
Although the custody framework does not trigger a
general duty to protect, courts more recently have focused on
whether the school’s special relationship to students itself
triggered a broader duty to protect. Indeed, in a separate
common law context, the California Supreme Court in
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California88 famously
held that a therapist with knowledge that a patient was
likely to injure someone had a “duty to warn” the victim and
could be sued in negligence for such failure. The duty flowed
from the special relationship between therapist and patient.
The therapist need not be omniscient, but must exercise a
reasonable degree of skill in forecasting violence and
determining when to warn specific victims.
Some jurisdictions have applied Tarasoff explicitly to
schools. For example, in Phyllis P. v. Superior Court,89 the
court applied Tarasoff to the school setting, holding that the
school had a duty to inform a student’s mother that the
student had been molested at school. The student
subsequently was raped, and the mother sued for the school’s
failure to warn of that danger. Custody was not the lynchpin,
but rather the unique relationship between school and
student.
Typically, courts have held that the schools’ “special

86. Id.
87. Id. at 307; see also Pichler v. United States Fire Ins. Co., No. 98-1337,
1999 Wisc. App. LEXIS 754 at *6 (holding that only if “the danger is so clear and
the solution so evident that the officer’s obligation admits but one immediate
course” would immunity be defeated).
88. 551 P.2d 334, 343–44 (Cal. 1976).
89. 228 Cal. Rptr. 776, 777 (Ct. App. 1986).
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relationship” to students requires a duty to protect without
citing Tarasoff. For instance, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
in Williams v. Kentucky Department of Education90 reflected
that “the ‘special relationship’ thus formed between a school
district and its students imposes an affirmative duty on the
district, its faculty, and its administrators to take all
reasonable steps to prevent foreseeable harm to its
students.”91 Similarly, the Maryland Court of Appeals in
Eisel v. Board of Education92 held that a school with specific
knowledge of a student’s suicidal impulses could be liable
despite the fact that the suicide took place in the student’s
home. Even when the harm arises off site, the school can still
be liable because of the special relationship.93
Although some courts have not been explicit as to
whether liability is based on the custody or the special
relationship theory, the difference can be palpable. The
custody theory focuses on liability for acts at school, whether
in the classroom, at the gym, or in a bathroom. In contrast,
liability under the special relationship theory is potentially
far broader, for it is not limited by geography, as the court in
Eisel determined.
C. Affirmative Act
Courts have held that, even when no duty to protect
arises through the custody or special relationship theories,
liability can exist if the plaintiff relied on the defendant’s
affirmative act, or if the defendant’s conduct makes the risk

90. 113 S.W.3d 145 (Ky. 2003).
91. Id. at 148. See, e.g., Beshears v. Unified Sch. Dist. 305, 930 P.2d 1376,
1383 (Kan. 1997); Munn v. Hotchkiss Sch., 165 A.3d 1167, 1173 (Conn. 2017);
Murray v. Hudson, 34 N.E.3d 728, 733 (Mass. 2015); Hendrickson v. Moses Lake
Sch. Dist., 398 P.3d 1199, 1200 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
92. 597 A.2d 447, 450 (Md. 1991).
93. “[A] school district may owe a duty to its students, despite the fact that
injury occurred off of school grounds and outside of school hours.” Stoddart v.
Pocatello Sch. Dist., 239 P.3d 784, 789 (Idaho 2010) (citing Brooks v. Logan, 903
P.2d 73 (Idaho 1995)).
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of harm worse.94 With respect to reliance, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts explains that one who provides for the
protection of another is subject to liability for physical harm
resulting from a failure to exercise reasonable care if “the
harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the
undertaking.”95 In Florence v. Goldberg,96 for example, a
police department voluntarily assigned an individual to help
students cross at a dangerous intersection. Plaintiff walked
her child to the intersection and was reassured that the
police were continuously helping. When the police guard was
ill, the police department failed to notify the school, and an
accident occurred at the intersection injuring the child.97 The
student’s mother sued, and the court concluded that a suit
could proceed because she had relied on the officer’s help and
therefore had not herself accompanied her child through the
intersection.98
Similarly, in Jefferson County School District v. Justus,99
the court refused to dismiss a challenge predicated on the
school’s allegedly negligent efforts to ensure the safety of
first graders. The school had prohibited first graders from
riding bicycles to school, disseminated such information to
parents, and evidently posted faculty at the front of the
school to enforce the rule.100 A car collided with plaintiff’s son
while he was riding a bicycle home from school.101 The court
held that, through the communications with parents and the
94. Chisolm v. Stephens, 365 N.E.2d 80, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); see also Sculles
v. Am. Envtl. Prods., Inc., 592 N.E.2d 271, 274 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (Am. Law Inst. 1965).
96. 375 N.E.2d 763, 765 (N.Y. 1978).
97. Id.
98. Id. See also Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348, 359 (11th
Cir. 1989) (holding that prison officials had a special duty to defendant injured
by member of inmate work squad); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 596 (9th
Cir. 1989).
99. 725 P.2d 767, 773 (Colo. 1986).
100. Id. at 768.
101. Id.
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posting of teachers, the school may have induced the parents
of the first grader to rely on those protections.102 Thus, the
school could be liable for negligence in allowing the son to
bicycle home.103
With respect to the risk of increased harm, a school may
be liable if it carelessly gives a warning that increases the
level of existing risk. Consider the Section 1983 action in
Armijo v. Wagon Mound Public Schools.104 Plaintiff argued
that the school authorities increased the risk of harm to a
suicidal student.105 School officials suspended and sent the
student home without complying with the school’s policy of
notifying his parents.106 School administrators evidently also
knew that the student had access to guns in the house.107 The
Tenth Circuit determined that, if the plaintiff could
demonstrate that the school’s handling of the disciplinary
issue augmented the likelihood of harm, the Due Process suit
could proceed.108 Whether on or outside the school’s
premises, liability may arise if the school administrators’
conduct heightens the risk, as in Armijo.109
To summarize, courts have imposed liability on schools
for failing to protect their students under three rationales:
custody, special relationship and affirmative acts
undertaken to protect those students. Although liability
historically was reserved for injuries occurring only on the
premises, the special relationship and affirmative act
102. Id. at 773.
103. Id.; see also Wright-Young v. Chicago State Univ., No. 1-18-1073, 2019
WL 4738855, at 13–14 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019) (affirming jury verdict against school
board and finding that school board voluntarily assumed duty “to make future
sporting events safer for students” after principal sent letter to parents assuring
them that additional security precautions would be taken at future games).
104. 159 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir. 1998).
105. Id. at 1262.
106. Id. at 1257.
107. Id. at 1264.
108. Id.
109. Id.

2019]

AI GOES TO SCHOOL

1347

theories expanded liability to include at least some injuries
off premises.
III. IMPACT OF SMPS ON SCHOOL DISTRICT LIABILITY
Adoption of SMPs may alter the liability of school
districts in several ways—at least in those school districts in
which a special relationship/duty to protect theory is viable.
Perhaps most dramatically, adoption of an SMP reflects a
good faith effort by school districts to protect the interests of
their students. Accordingly, school districts should escape
liability for any harm that ensues when following the steps
indicated by the SMP—whether those steps counsel for
intervention or not.
At the same time, reliance on SMPs may increase school
district liability in more narrow contexts. First, a failure to
follow through on SMP alerts likely will be deemed
ministerial and therefore open school districts to liability in
most jurisdictions. Although the school administrators in the
absence of the SMP perhaps would not have alerted parents
to possible harm, it is far more difficult to defend a failure to
warn when the SMP protocols indicate that further action
was due. Related, the school districts’ duty to warn likely will
extend to the home and even to when school is not in session,
as long as information flowing through the SMP signals that
a warning is required. Second, because school districts
arguably induce reliance on the safety measures undertaken
through SMPs, plaintiffs may more readily argue that the
school districts breached a duty of care when violence occurs
even if an SMP has not issued an alert. By affirmatively
adopting an SMP, a school district arguably lowers the
vigilance of parents and their children who rely upon SMPs
for protection. And, if the school heightens the risk of harm
by mishandling the warning, liability for negligence can
attach as well. Third, at some point in the future, school
districts might be found liable for not adopting an SMP given
the considerable benefits that can be gained. Unless the
district can show it chose not to utilize an SMP for policy
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reasons, its failure to act may reflect the kind of ministerial
negligence that will defeat immunity.
A. SMPs as a Defense
In essence, school districts outsource digital monitoring
to SMPs. That delegation reflects a proactive step that school
districts have taken to help prevent their students from
coming to harm. In light of the SMPs’ credible assertions of
efficacy, any claim of negligence for failing to warn arising
from information within the domain of the SMP that did not
result in an alert readily should be dismissed. School
districts act reasonably in utilizing SMPs to prevent harm to
those in their charge.
When professionals follow the standard of reasonable
care in their profession or exceed that standard, courts
generally accept such evidence as persuasive against claims
of negligence. In the malpractice context, for instance,
physicians escape liability if they follow standards in their
profession, and when they adopt prevailing technology, they
generally are protected as well.110 When educational
professionals adopt state of the art technology and follow the
protocols indicated, they should escape liability. In Brandy
B,111 for example, if the SMP had not indicated that an alert
was needed, the school should have prevailed at the
summary judgment stage.
To be sure, some claims may still arise outside the SMP
system. Schoolmates may come directly to administrators or
teachers with concern for suicidal tendencies or planned

110. See, e.g., Theodore Silver, One Hundred Years of Harmful Error: The
Historical Jurisprudence of Medical Malpractice, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1193, 1212
(1992) (explaining that courts have shielded physicians from liability when
conforming to standard practices); see also Michael D. Greenberg, Medical
Malpractice and New Devices: Defining an Elusive Standard, 19 HEALTH MATRIX
423, 428–34 (2009) (noting that courts have precluded recovery for malpractice
in most jurisdictions if physicians follow prevailing standards, including techenabled practices).
111. Supra note 81.
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gang fights. In Matallana,112 the danger was communicated
to the security guard directly and not via emails or chat
rooms. Similarly, in Colette,113 there undoubtedly was
negligence, but use of the SMP would not have detected any
information calling for an alert. School districts may be found
liable in those contexts for failing to respond adequately.
But, if the information flows through the SMP and the SMP
does not call for an alert, no liability should exist.
B. Loss of Immunity for Failure to Communicate Alert
On the other hand, introduction of SMPs may open
schools to liability for converting what before was a
discretionary duty to warn to a ministerial act if dictated by
the SMP algorithm.114 School administrators previously had
to reach the complex decision of whether to warn and how to
warn given the context-specific facts. Judgment ruled, and
courts were loath to intrude upon that judgment, frequently
ruling that immunity precluded suit. But, for matters
covered by SMPs, school district responses become less
discretionary—either the SMP analytics call for a warning or
not. Once the SMP places the information in the school’s
hands, school administrators must respond. Thus, school
districts must communicate alerts dictated by the SMP or
face the loss of immunity.
Moreover, particularly in light of the breadth of the
information channeled through the SMP, the duty to protect
likely will not be confined to a school’s premises, as it has
largely been in the past. Information gleaned from emails or
Facebook are not confined to the school setting. As in Eisel,
schools increasingly will be required to intervene to prevent
harm wherever it occurs, as long as the information concerns
a student and addresses a relatively specific harm. The SMP
extends the special relationship between school and student
112. Supra note 73.
113. Supra note 75.
114. The duty to warn is an aspect, of course, of the school’s duty to protect.
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because it places so much more information in the
administrators’ possession.
Return to the fact pattern in Stephenson.115 If the SMP
had detected the animosity between the two boys and
concern for an assault became heightened, a school’s failure
to heed the alert may have opened the school district to
liability for injuries even blocks away from the school. A
school cannot turn a blind eye to credible information that
harm is imminent.
Indeed, experience under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA)116 bolsters the view that failure to comply with an
alert from an SMP will expose a school district to liability. In
partially waiving the federal government’s immunity from
tort actions, Congress precluded recovery for challenges to
governmental acts that were “based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty.”117 The Supreme Court’s
construction of the discretionary function exception has
varied over the years, but it has fashioned a number of tests
to distinguish planning level or policy decisions that are
covered by the exception from operational or ministerial
actions that are not.118 The current doctrine, espoused in
United States v. Gaubert,119 establishes a two-part test to
determine which federal governmental actions are exempt
from suit. The Court provided that only those governmental
actions that stem from acts grounded in “social, economic or
political” policies fall within the exception, and only then if
the governing rules and regulations left the government
actor with a choice.120

115. Supra note 66.
116. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (2012).
117. Id. § 2680.
118. See, e.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 35–36 (1953); see also
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 67–68 (1955).
119. 499 U.S. 315, 321–23 (1991).
120. Id. at 323.
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As applied to the failure to protect context, courts have
held that, if the federal government actor’s failure stems
from oversight or inattention, the discretionary function
exception does not apply. But if the failure stems from an
economic or social decision, then liability will not attach. For
instance, in Rich v. United States, the question raised was
whether the federal government should have warned of a
dangerous intersection instead of relying on a guardrail.121
Given that the decision as to what kind of warning to give
stemmed from social and economic policy, the court held the
discretionary function exception was applicable.122 But, if
plaintiff had been able to show that the government knew of
the danger and simply failed to act, liability could have
followed. 123 Indeed, in Cope v. Scott, the D.C. Circuit went
further and stated that, although the decision whether to
warn itself was discretionary, the decision on how to
implement the warning did not involve the type of discretion
protected by the exception because the implementation
decision was technical as opposed to being steeped in
policy.124
Viewed with the lens borrowed from the FTCA, school
districts’ utilization of SMPs eliminates much of the
discretion that the administrators otherwise would exercise
when reviewing online writing or postings. The school’s
implementation of the SMP in effect has delegated that
judgment or expertise to the AI program. As such, school
districts would be hard-pressed to argue that they retained
discretion to deviate from the recommended alerts and,
accordingly, any such deviation could subject the school to
liability. Indeed, the reasoning in Cope and similar cases
leaves open the argument that the school’s ineffective
121. 119 F.3d 447, 449 (6th Cir. 1997).
122. Id. at 451–52.
123. See, e.g., Burns v. Gagnon, 727 S.E.2d 634, 643–44 (Va. 2012) (holding the
jury could determine that administrator’s silence after being given warning of
imminent attack was actionable).
124. 45 F.3d 445, 451–52 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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conveyance of a warning might itself be actionable if the
manner of the warning failed to communicate the risk
successfully, and did not involve any policy considerations.
There undoubtedly is an anomaly that arises from
imposing liability on a school district after it adopts an SMP.
School districts that eschew the technology learn fewer of the
dangers their students face and, yet, paradoxically are less
likely to be held liable as long as they act whenever receiving
specific evidence of a threat. In contrast, with the
introduction of SMPs, schools will have far more intimate
knowledge of students’ lives and far more responsibility to
warn of potential harm, whether on or outside school
premises. With greater knowledge comes greater
responsibility. But, the paradox seems less jarring given that
school districts can also defend themselves by relying on the
SMP as a shield to deflect liability whenever the protocols
are followed.
To minimize the potential for liability, school districts
should make a record each time they disagree with the alert
suggested by the SMP, and briefly indicate the reasons for
withholding the alert. In that way, school districts can lessen
the potential for liability, despite the disregard for the SMP
alert.125 Moreover, communicating alerts to parents or
guardians of any suicidal tendencies should absolve the
school of any liability. The parents have primary
responsibility for seeking treatment and care once the alert
has been given. School districts, therefore, should err on the
side of alerting parents in any close case. But, when the
threat of harm comes from another student or a staff
member, no such alerts are possible.

125. Liability for failure to provide necessary information to the SMP raises
another potential problem. If the failure to supply needed background to the SMP
can be linked to the failure to alert, the school district can defend on the ground
that no clear parameters for when to furnish the information were given. On the
other hand, if the failure to communicate adequately with the SMP stems from a
ministerial failure, liability may attach.
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C. Affirmative Act
Finally, there is some risk that a school district’s
affirmative act in adopting an SMP may induce reliance and
lead to a finding of a more pervasive duty to protect than now
governs. As discussed,126 any affirmative acts taken to
protect students may trigger negligence liability if they
induce reliance, as in the Florence and Jefferson County
cases. Utilization of SMPs may enhance that risk.
Schools utilize SMPs to identify signs of bullying, selfharm, suicide, and school violence.127 The technology
providers themselves say they do so to protect students from
these harms.128 And schools then publicly advertise student
protection as a reason for implementing the SMPs.129 Indeed,
the more that SMPs tout their efficacy, the more that they
may dampen the watchfulness that parents otherwise would
exert. Schools utilizing SMPs may not detect every potential
risk; but those schools can still monitor exponentially more
than previously.
Thus, considering the purpose of SMPs, the manner in
which technology providers advertise them, and the reasons
schools offer for implementing them, it becomes difficult to
envision the implementation of an SMP as anything other
than an affirmative action taken to protect.
Given that students and their parents know of the SMP
utilization, they arguably become less likely to take steps to
126. See supra Part II.C (discussing the Florence and Jefferson County cases).
127. See Benjamin Herold, Schools Are Deploying Massive Digital Surveillance
Systems. The Results Are Alarming, EDUCATION WEEK (May 30, 2019),
https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2019/05/30/schools-are-deploying-massivedigital-surveillance-systems.html.
128. Id. (quoting technology provider executives regarding a school’s need to
protect its students by implementing an SMP).
129. Charlotte Andrist, Nearly 1,200 School Districts Renew Partnerships with
Gaggle, PRWEB (May 16, 2019), https://www.prweb.com/releases/nearly
_1_200_school_districts_renew_partnerships_with_gaggle/prweb16315062.htm
(quoting the Denver Public Schools’ Director of Emergency Management as
saying that the district relies on its use of an SMP to keep students safe).
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ensure student safety. When students know they are subject
to continuous surveillance at young ages, they may come to
anticipate that someone is always watching. For example,
some students may assume that, if they write a call for help
on their laptop, a school official will intervene. Although
SMPs may detect much of this behavior, the technology
cannot be expected to detect everything; nor can schools
respond effectively in every situation in which the technology
does detect a warning sign. If harm to the student then
occurs, the affirmative act doctrine provides a basis upon
which a plaintiff might argue for school liability. As a result,
schools should be mindful that some students may assume
that someone is always ready and able to help.
In utilizing SMPs, therefore, school districts should take
care not to tout the capacity of SMPs too expansively. The
more that school districts reassure students and their
parents that they can prevent harm before it happens, the
more they may unintentionally encourage overreliance on
the monitoring system. Harm can befall students that the
SMPs cannot detect and prevent, and schools may not
respond effectively in the eyes of a jury. The risk is that
students and their parents will take fewer precautions in
light of operation of the SMPs. Therefore, to avoid liability,
school districts should stress that SMPs remain just a tool to
oversee the safety of their charges, and that it is up to
children and their parents to remain vigilant at all times.
D. Failure to Adopt an SMP
At first blush, it stretches credulity to argue that a school
district’s failure to adopt an SMP can itself open a school
district to liability. After all, a district’s decision whether to
adopt an SMP stems from economic and social decisionmaking, taking into account factors such as expense, efficacy,
and privacy.
Yet, if SMPs prove as successful as advertised, districts
that furnish computers and use management software to
monitor student writing will become increasingly hard-
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pressed to justify not utilizing SMPs. Plaintiffs may argue
that the failure to take such a step, in the face of the efficacy
of an SMP, demonstrates deliberate indifference to the safety
of pupils in their charge.130
Consider the example of smoke detectors or smoke
alarms in homes. Over one hundred years ago, individuals
faced a small chance of survival if their home caught fire.131
With the invention of smoke detectors, the chance of survival
grew. The first smoke detectors were extremely expensive.132
And they still had to be improved to the point at which people
could reasonably rely on them to alert to a fire.
Today, however, a failure to install a smoke alarm may
be evidence of negligence. For example, in the Ohio case of
Starost v. Bradley,133 plaintiff filed suit alleging negligence
for failure to install smoke detectors after being seriously
injured in a fire.134 The court noted that “installation of
smoke detector alarms in buildings creates an inference that
the alarms will diminish the risk of harm to persons . . .
because the alarm is designed and intended to warn them of
the fire in its early stages.”135 Based in part on that finding,
the court concluded that the failure to install a smoke alarm
was a permissible factor for a jury to consider in determining
liability, even if the failure may not have been negligence per

130. Indeed, the Minnesota Appellate Court in S.W. v. Spring Lake Park
School District No. 16, 580 N.W.2d 19, 23 (Minn. 1998), held that a school
district’s failure to adopt a security policy is not entitled to immunity unless the
court is convinced that the lack of a policy was intended to enhance security—
“were we to hold that the simple absence of a policy or a decision not to have a
policy entitles government entities to immunity under the statute, we would be
providing government decisionmakers an incentive to avoid making the difficult
decisions which the statute was designed to protect.” Id.
131. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SMOKE ALARMS, http://www.mysmokealarm.org/
history-of-smoke-alarms/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2019).
132. Id.
133. No. 17319, 1999 WL 41897, at *1 (Ohio App. 2d 1999).
134. Id.
135. Id. at *5.
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se.136
A more recent example involves the steps needed to
protect the integrity of data stored online. In the early days
of the internet, businesses could not be found negligent for
failing to install anti-virus, anti-malware, or any protective
software on their websites. Now, one can search for
protective software on the internet, and pages of providers
with costs and guarantees pop up. Within a decade, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) moved to fine companies
for failing to install protective software to protect against
data hacking.137 In F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide
Corporation, the agency brought an action against
defendants for “failure to maintain reasonable and
appropriate data security for consumers’ sensitive personal
information,” which the agency contended was in violation of
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.138
Specifically, defendant failed to monitor its computer
network for malware.139 Even though defendant argued that
it had no notice of what the FTC deemed to be reasonable
and appropriate data security, the court upheld the FTC’s
determination.140 The Third Circuit affirmed the trial court’s
decision, adding that defendant “failed to use any firewall at
critical network points, did not restrict specific IP addresses
at all, [and] did not use any encryption for certain customer
files.”141 Private suits have been filed on comparable
136. Id. at *5–6.
137. See, e.g., Complaint at ¶ 7, 9–10, In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, 2005 WL
1541551 (F.T.C. 2005) (No. 042-3160).
138. 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 607 (D.N.J. 2014) (quoting First Amended Complaint
for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at ¶¶ 1, 44–49, Wyndham Worldwide
Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (No. 13-1877(ES))).
139. Id. at 629.
140. Id. at 616, 636.
141. F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 79 F.3d 236, 256 (3d Cir. 2015). The
FTC also issued a guidebook, which describes certain practices that form a sound
data security plan, though no particular practice is necessarily required. FED.
TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING PERSONAL INFORMATION: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS
(2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0136_
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theories, as in the massive Anthem data breach case.142
Much more quickly than in the smoke alarm context,
technology developed that became an essential part of the
duty to protect.
The examples above illustrate how the invention of new
technology can change safety requirements and the duty to
protect in various contexts. They also show that the change
in protective measures is typically not immediate due to
factors such as cost, reliability, and development. Yet, as
SMPs become the norm, plaintiffs may argue in the future
that a school district’s failure to adopt comparable protective
measures itself manifests negligence.
IV. SCHOOL DISTRICT RESPONSIBILITY FOR A TECHNOLOGY
COMPANY’S NEGLIGENCE
Separate from the issue of liability for a school district’s
own negligence is the issue of a school district’s potential
liability for a technology company’s negligence. For instance,
a private company deploying an SMP may fail to notify a
school about flagged incidents or fail to detect warning signs
proteting-personal-information.pdf. The recommended practices are encrypting
sensitive information stored on the computer network, checking software
vendors’ websites for alerts about new vulnerabilities, using a firewall to protect
a computer from hackers, setting access controls, requiring employees to use
strong passwords, and implementing a breach response plan. Id. at 10, 13, 17, 22.
Additionally, the Federal Communications Commission recommends use of web
filtering, antivirus signature protection, proactive malware protection, firewalls,
strong security policies, and employee training as a combination of techniques to
lower the risk of security threats. FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, CYBER SECURITY
PLANNING GUIDE, at SF-3 (2012), https://transition.fcc.gov/cyber/cyber
planner.pdf.
142. In In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litigation, a number of lawsuits were
filed against Anthem and Blue Cross Blue Shield Association after
cyberattackers breached the Anthem database. 162 F. Supp. 3d 953, 965 (N.D.
Cal. 2016). The Anthem database held members’ personal information, including
individually identifiable health information. Id. at 966–67. In all, the Anthem
database contained the personal identification information of approximately 80
million individuals. Id. at 967. Plaintiffs alleged in part that Anthem and Blue
Cross failed to protect the data systems adequately. Id. at 967–68. The court
determined that defendants failed to take appropriate measures to protect their
members, especially in light of available data security technology.
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of potential risks of harm because of inadequate algorithms.
In general, a school district would not be liable for any
negligent act or omission by an independent contractor such
as a technology company.143 There are, however, various
exceptions to this general rule of non-liability. Although
these exceptions can be numerous and vary significantly
across jurisdictions, they broadly fall into three categories:
the school district (1) was negligent in selecting, instructing,
or supervising the technology company; (2) has a nondelegable duty; or (3) hired a contractor to perform work that
is inherently dangerous.144 Only the first two exceptions are
relevant here.145
Yet even when considering these exceptions, it is
generally unlikely that school districts would be liable under
existing law for a technology company’s negligence. First,
courts would likely consider technology companies to be
independent contractors. Second, it is unlikely that school
districts would be liable for negligently selecting or
supervising technology companies. Finally, it is also unlikely
that courts would determine that a school’s duty to protect
students is non-delegable.

143. See, e.g., Jacks v. Tipton Cmty. Sch. Corp., 94 N.E.3d 712, 719 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2018); see also McCurry v. Sch. Dist. of Valley, 496 N.W.2d 433, 439 (Neb.
1993); Saiz v. Belen Sch. Dist., 827 P.2d 102, 108 (N.M. 1992); Begley v. City of
New York, 972 N.Y.S.2d 48, 66 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2013); Lofy v. Joint Sch.
Dist. No. 2, 166 N.W.2d 809, 813 (Wis. 1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 409.
144. See McCurry, 496 N.W.2d at 439; see also Saiz, 827 P.2d at 108; Begley,
972 N.Y.S.2d at 66; Lofy, 166 N.W.2d at 813; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 409.
145. For the third exception to apply, generally the contracted work itself must
be inherently dangerous. See, e.g., Saiz, 827 P.2d at 110 (“[O]ne who employs an
independent contractor to do work that the employer as a matter of law should
recognize as likely to create a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless
reasonable precautions are taken is liable for physical harm to others caused by
an absence of those precautions.”) (emphasis added); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 409. Administering SMPs itself does not create a peculiar
risk of harm similar to other activities such as operating certain machinery or
performing maintenance on high voltage electrical equipment.
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A. Technology Companies as Independent Contractors
A threshold inquiry is whether a technology company in
this context is an independent contractor as opposed to a
servant or an employee. The general rule of non-liability
applies only if the contracting party is in fact an independent
contractor instead of an employee.146 The test courts use to
classify independent contractors as opposed to employees
varies considerably across jurisdictions and is often a very
fact-intensive inquiry.147 Courts typically balance numerous
factors, none of which is determinative.148 The most
important factor courts consider is that the independent
contractor has the ability to control the method and means
of the work while the employer may control the results of the
work.149 There are also various other factors courts consider,
such as the nature of the work, the degree of skill or expertise
required, which party supplies the instrumentalities of the
work, the length of time required to complete the work, the
method of payment, and the parties’ intent in forming the
relationship.150
In the SMP context, courts likely would consider
technology companies to be independent contractors. A
school district’s role in administering SMPs is typically
triggered only after a technology company notifies the school
of a potential risk. Although schools may suggest phrases to
monitor after considering the local slang and any particular
school issues, the technology companies implement those
146. Smith v. Fall River Joint Union High Sch. Dist., 5 P.2d 930, 933 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1931).
147. E.g., McCurry, 496 N.W.2d at 439; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
§ 409.

OF

TORTS

148. E.g., McCurry, 496 N.W.2d at 439.
149. Id.; see also Smith, 5 P.2d at 933 (determining a school bus driver was not
an independent contractor where the school could terminate the contract at will
because “[b]y retaining the power of discharge the district was virtually in a
position to control every act of the driver”).
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409; see also 41 AM. JUR. 2D
Independent Contractors §§ 1, 5 (2015).
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suggestions. And, while school districts may provide
students the devices and accounts that technology companies
monitor, technology companies design and implement the
SMP programs and algorithms and may also own intellectual
property rights related to the SMP. Moreover, technology
companies typically contract with numerous school districts
to provide the same or similar services. Thus, courts would
likely consider technology companies administering SMPs to
be independent contractors, which would generally insulate
school districts from liability for a technology company’s
negligence.
However, schools should still recognize that the general
rule of non-liability applies only for an independent
contractor’s negligence.151 Schools may still be liable for their
own negligence even if an independent contractor
relationship exists. School districts may still make certain
decisions in administering SMPs, such as deciding which
phrases to monitor and flag, when and how to notify parents
and interested parties of incidents, or how to handle
investigations.152 As previously discussed, a school district’s
liability for this type of conduct depends on the applicable
law regarding immunity and the school’s duty to protect.153
Therefore, while courts are likely to characterize technology
companies as independent contractors, school districts
should still take special consideration as to how their own
potential negligence may prompt liability.154

151. McCurry, 496 N.W.2d at 439.
152. See supra Part I.
153. See supra Parts II–III. For example, in negligence cases involving schoolprovided transportation, jurisdictions differ on how immunity applies when
school officials designate bus stops and design bus routes. Some jurisdictions
categorize these decisions as operational decisions and others categorize them as
discretionary or policy-implementing decisions. Compare Warrington v. Tempe
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 3, 928 P.2d 673, 677 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1st Div. 1996)
(determining sovereign immunity does not apply), with McNees v. Scholley, 208
N.W.2d 643, 646 (Mich. App. Ct. 3d Div. 1973) (determining sovereign immunity
applies).
154. See supra Part III.
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B. School District Liability for Negligently Selecting,
Instructing, or Supervising Technology Companies
Even where an independent contractor relationship
exists, the employer may still be liable for negligently
selecting, instructing, or supervising the contractor.155 First,
if a contractor turns out to be incompetent, an employer can
be liable for failing to use reasonable care in selecting the
contractor to perform a duty the employer owes to a third
person.156 The Restatement (Second) of Torts describes a
competent contractor as one “who possesses the knowledge,
skill, experience, and available equipment which a
reasonable man would realize that a contractor must have in
order to do the work which he is employed to do without
creating unreasonable risk of injury to others[.]”157 The
amount of care required in selecting a contractor depends on
factors such as the risk of harm from negligently completing
the work, the expertise required to complete the work, and
the relationship of the parties that creates the employer’s
duty owed to the other party.158 Second, an employer can be
liable for negligently instructing, inspecting the work of, or
supervising an independent contractor.159 This is often
applicable in the premises liability context where, for
example, a school may be liable for failing to inspect the work
of an independent contractor who designed and built an
addition to the school.160
A school district’s liability for negligently selecting,
instructing, or supervising an independent contractor is
particularly relevant when schools delegate supervision of

155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 411–14.
156. Settles v. Inc. Vill. of Freeport, 503 N.Y.S.2d 945, 948 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411.
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411.
158. Id.
159. Williams v. Cent. Consol. Sch. Dist., 952 P.2d 978, 982 (N.M. Ct. App.
1997); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 412–14.
160. See Williams, 952 P.2d at 983.
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students. Yet this exception to the general rule of nonliability is merely an extension of the school’s own
negligence, meaning the school’s negligence must still be the
proximate cause of the harm producing the plaintiff’s
injury.161 For example, in Greening by Greening v. School
District of Millard, a disabled student sued the school district
after injuring his leg in a physical therapy program run
through the school.162 A licensed physical therapist designed
the student’s physical therapy program but later delegated
supervision of the student’s exercises to a school employee,
who was not a licensed physical therapist.163 The Nebraska
Supreme Court held that the school was not liable for
permitting the unqualified employee to oversee the student’s
exercise program because there was no evidence suggesting
that the incompetent employee’s conduct proximately caused
the injury.164 The court stated that, if an undue risk of harm
“exists because of the quality of the employee, there is
liability only to the extent that the harm is caused by the
quality of the employee which the employer had reason to
suppose would be likely to cause harm.”165
In the SMP context, a school district’s liability for
negligently selecting, instructing, or supervising a
technology company can also be a fact-intensive inquiry and
vary across jurisdictions based on the parties’ relationship.
A school may be liable if it fails to perform diligence in
selecting an SMP provider. Due diligence may include
checking the technology company’s credentials and ability to
perform what the company advertises. Schools should also
diligently instruct and supervise technology companies. This
can include instructing companies on the best phrases to flag

161. Greening v. Sch. Dist. of Millard, 393 N.W.2d 51, 57-58 (Neb. 1986).
162. Id. at 55–56.
163. Id. at 55.
164. Id. at 57–58.
165. Id. at 58 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958)).
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depending on the schools’ specific issues.166 However, even if
a school district negligently selected, instructed, or
supervised a technology company, the school’s negligence
must still be the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.
Because of this limitation, it is less likely that a school
district would be liable under this exception.167 Even so,
school districts should still carefully consider a technology
company’s qualifications and should take adequate
precautions when administering SMPs.
C. Delegating a School’s Duty to Protect Students
Employers have also been liable for an independent
contractor’s negligence where the employer hired the
contractor to perform a non-delegable duty.168 A nondelegable duty can arise by common law or by statute, but is
typically deemed “so vital or important to the community
that the employer should not be permitted to transfer or
delegate it to an independent contractor.”169 Courts often
broadly apply exceptions to the general rule of non-liability,
relying on numerous different exceptions and allowing
considerable overlap in how to formulate each exception.170
And, because school districts only recently began to use
SMPs, there is little controlling case law on whether a
school’s duty to protect is delegable. Accordingly, this section
describes how courts have applied the non-delegable duty
exception to various school duties of care arising by common
166. For instance, a school should instruct a technology company to monitor
for a phrase if the school is aware of an issue with a particular type of drug at the
school that students may commonly refer to by a local slang term. This concept
is discussed in greater detail supra Part III.
167. See, e.g., Greening, 398 N.W.2d at 58.
168. See, e.g., Carabba v. Anacortes Sch. Dist. No. 103, 435 P.2d 936, 948
(Wash. 1967).
169. Richard. J. Hunter, Jr., An “Insider’s” Guide to the Legal Liability of
Sports Contest Officials, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 369, 409 (2005); see also Jacks
v. Tipton Cmty. Sch. Corp., 94 N.E.3d 712, 719 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
170. Saiz v. Belen Sch. Dist., 827 P.2d 102, 109 (N.M. 1992); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409.
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law and then by statute, concluding that courts are unlikely
to determine that a school’s duty to protect is nondelegable.171
1. Delegating a School’s Common Law Duty to Protect
Most relevant to this inquiry is how courts have applied
the non-delegable duty exception to schools’ common law
duty to protect, and courts have adopted contrasting
approaches.172 At least one court has determined that a
school’s duty to protect is non-delegable. In Carabba v.
Anacortes School District Number 103,173 the student body
associations of two schools jointly sponsored a wrestling meet
and employed a referee from an independent high school
wrestling association to monitor the matches. During one
match, a student became paralyzed after being put in a full
nelson (an illegal wrestling move) while the referee was
distracted.174 The Washington Supreme Court first
determined that the schools were liable for the student body
associations’ conduct because the schools tightly controlled
the associations and the wrestling meet was “under the

171. For an argument that schools should have a non-delegable duty to provide
an equal educational opportunity based on a sexual harassment theory, see Ivan
E. Bodensteiner, Peer Harassment-Interference with an Equal Educational
Opportunity in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 79 NEB. L. REV. 1, 40–41
(2000).
172. Compare Kennel v. Carson City Sch. Dist., 738 F. Supp. 376, 379 (D. Nev.
1990) (holding a school’s duty to protect is delegable), with Carabba, 435 P.2d at
948 (holding a school’s duty to protect is non-delegable). It is also worth noting
that this analysis is relevant only where technology companies contract directly
with the school district and not with a separate entity, such as a state agency.
See Greening, 393 N.W.2d at 57 (declining to determine whether a school’s duty
to protect was delegable where the state, not school district, employed an
independent contractor to supervise student). A school district may be further
insulated from a technology company’s negligence where the technology company
contracts with and operates under the direction of a state agency instead of
directly with the school district. However, this type of engagement does not
appear to be the current industry trend. See supra Section I.
173. 435 P.2d at 939.
174. Id.
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auspices” of the school districts.175 Further, the court ruled
that the schools could be liable for negligent supervision even
though they employed the referee, an independent
contractor, to monitor the wrestling match.176 In so holding,
the court stated that a party’s duty of care to protect a third
party is non-delegable and “satisfied if, and only if, the
person to whom the work of protection is delegated is careful
in giving the protection.”177
In the SMP context, however, it appears generally
unlikely that Carabba would control how courts would apply
the non-delegable duty exception. At least one court has
declined to follow Carabba and has instead held that a
school’s duty to protect is delegable.178 As discussed in detail
above, an employer’s liability for negligence of an
independent contractor and employee alike is based on the
concept of control, which Carabba does not consider at
length.179 Rules on classifying an independent contractor and
the doctrine of respondeat superior are both based on the
employer’s right and ability to control the agent’s work.180
Yet, schools exert little control over how technology
companies design and administer SMPs.181 As a result, even
if courts extend a school’s common law duty to protect based
on how SMPs change a school’s custodial nature, it is still
generally unlikely that courts would determine that a
school’s duty to protect is non-delegable.

175. Id. at 947.
176. Id. at 948.
177. Id. at 947–48 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 214).
178. Kennel v. Carson City Sch. Dist., 738 F. Supp. 376, 379 (D. Nev. 1990).
179. Id.; see also Smith v. Fall River Joint Union High Sch. Dist., 5 P.2d 930,
933 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931); McCurry v. Sch. Dist. Of Valley, 496 N.W.2d 433,
439 (Neb. 1993).
180. Kennel, 738 F. Supp. at 379.
181. See supra Part I.
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2. Delegating a School’s Statutory Duty of Care
Although schools’ duty to protect has historically been a
result of the common law, several statutes also impose
specific duties of care schools owe students. These statutes
can take a variety of forms. For example, many states have
recently enacted legislation regulating how schools must
prevent, mitigate, and respond to incidents of bullying
(including cyberbullying).182 Other laws may require schools
to implement programs for certain classes of students, such
as disabled students.183 Moreover, several states extensively
regulate safe transportation by schools (which, as with
administering SMPs, schools commonly contract this duty
out to independent bus companies).184 Even though these
statutory duties may vary in subject matter and
construction, courts have commonly determined that these
duties are delegable. While school districts should consult
their jurisdiction’s laws, it is unlikely in general that courts
will hold schools liable for a technology company’s negligence
based on a non-delegable statutory duty to protect.
First, many, if not all, states have comprehensive
regulations requiring schools to adopt anti-bullying
policies.185 Schools’ anti-bullying policies often must include
policies on preventing, mitigating, investigating, and
notifying interested parties about bullying, including
cyberbullying.186 A school’s statutory anti-bullying
responsibilities are dependent on the statutory language

182. For a summary and comparison of each jurisdiction’s laws and policies
regarding bullying and cyberbullying, see Laws, Policies & Regulations,
STOPBULLYING.GOV (Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.stopbullying.gov/laws/index
.html#1.
183. See, e.g., Begley v. City of New York, 972 N.Y.S.2d 48, 90 (N.Y. App. Div.
2d Dep’t 2013) (discussing the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1400–09 (2010)).
184. See, e.g., Lofy v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 106 N.W.2d 809, 811–12 (Wis. 1969)
(describing Wisconsin’s previous regulatory scheme for school transportation).
185. See Laws, Policies & Regulations, supra note 182.
186. Id.
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and, thus, can vary considerably across jurisdictions.187 Yet
even where states have adopted statutory anti-bullying
policies for schools, courts have often declined to hold schools
liable for failing to follow these policies, let alone determine
that any statutory anti-bullying duty is non-delegable.188
This trend is likely due to how courts often narrowly
interpret the statutory duties, particularly in light of the
school’s limited common law duty to address bullying
(especially outside of school premises).189
In similar vein, courts have also determined that other
specific statutory duties of care are delegable. For instance,
a New York court has held that a public school could delegate
supervision to a private school and a contracted school nurse
where a statute required schools to provide programs and
services for disabled students.190 The court held that the
public school was not liable where the private school had
primary custody and, hence, supervision of the disabled
student.191 And, even after considering the “importance of
ensuring that children who require nursing services to
attend school receive such services from competent
professionals,” the court reasoned that providing nursing
187. See, e.g., Gauthier v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 123 A.3d 1016, 1021 (N.H.
2015) (holding a school did not breach a statutory anti-bullying duty where the
statute did not create a private cause of action and the school did not have a
distinct common law duty to intervene).
188. See, e.g., Castillo v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 103 N.E.3d 596, 599–600 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2018) (holding Illinois’s bullying-prevention statute only
requires school districts to craft an anti-bullying policy, not to respond to bullying
incidents in any precise manner); see also Mulvey v. Carl Sandburg High Sch., 66
N.E.3d 507, 514 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2016) (holding a school district’s statutorily
required anti-bullying policy did not create a cause of action against the school
where the policy stated merely a general anti-bullying goal and did not promise
any particular result or action in response to bullying incidents).
189. See, e.g., Stephenson v. City of New York, 978 N.E. 1251, 1253–54 (“There
is no statutory duty to inform parents about generalized threats made at school,
and the circumstances here do not give rise to a common-law duty to notify
parents about threatened harm posed by a third party.”).
190. Begley v. City of New York, 972 N.Y.S.2d 48, 67 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t
2013).
191. Id. at 65.
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services is not “so integral” to the school’s “core responsibility
of educating children that, as a matter of public policy, it can
be deemed a nondelegable duty[.]”192 Thus, even though the
statute mandated detailed responsibilities to schools for
specific students, the court determined that those
responsibilities were delegable to both the private school and
the contractor-nurse.193
Finally, courts have also construed a school’s statutory
responsibility to provide reasonably safe transportation as
delegable. As one court has stated, a “plaintiff is under a
burden to demonstrate something more than the fact” that a
statute requires schools to safely transport students to and
from school for a school to be liable for an independent
contractor’s negligence.194 Courts often will not construe a
school’s transportation responsibilities as non-delegable
unless an accompanying common law duty or specific
statutory provision imposes strict liability on schools for
providing school transportation.195 But state laws regulating
school transportation rarely impose strict liability on schools
to ensure that students are safely transported to and from
school, even if an independent contractor provides the
transportation.196 As a result, courts are often hesitant to
frame these duties as non-delegable.
In sum, because courts have been reluctant to interpret
schools’ statutory duties of care as non-delegable, it is

192. Id. at 67.
193. Id.
194. Settles v. Inc. Vill. of Freeport, 503 N.Y.S.2d 945, 949 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
195. See id. at 948–49.
196. See, e.g., Chainani v. Bd. of Educ. of New York, 663 N.E.2d 283, 285 (N.Y.
1995) (holding a school district is not liable for a contracted bus driver’s
negligence where the school had no duty to ensure the driver complied with the
school bus safety regulations); see also Lofy v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 166 N.W.2d
809, 814 (Wis. 1969) (holding a school’s negligence liability for providing school
transportation is delegable where the statute afforded schools discretion in
whether to provide transportation and a provision permitted claims against the
state without mentioning claims against an independent contractor).
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unlikely that courts would do so within the SMP context. A
school’s duty to protect is likely delegable so long as there are
no statutory provisions imposing either strict liability or a
specific non-delegable duty to protect. Even if SMPs broaden
schools’ custodial nature, courts would likely still be
reluctant to categorize this duty as non-delegable because
schools exert little control over technology companies. And,
although supervising students is an integral aspect to
education, schools contracting with technology companies to
administer SMPs augment rather than abdicate a duty to
protect. SMPs enhance rather than merely delegate schools’
supervisory capacities. A school’s liability naturally depends
on a jurisdiction’s specific laws. But, overall, courts are
generally unlikely to hold school districts liable for a
technology company’s negligence in administering SMPs.
CONCLUSION
Technology can enhance a school district’s effort to
protect its students from harm. Although it is too early to
tell, SMPs hold great promise in preventing bullying and
facilitating early intervention in cases of suicidal tendencies.
Adoption of an SMP outsources a school’s duty to protect in
part to an outside technology company.
That contracting out likely will shift a school district’s
potential liability in several ways. First, school districts that
follow through on alerts indicated by the SMP should be
protected from liability for any harm that nonetheless
ensues. Second, any school district that ignores an SMP alert
may be liable if harm follows, even outside of school
premises, because utilization of an SMP increases the
geographic scope of a school’s duty. Third, school districts
must take steps to prevent adoption of the SMP as an
affirmative act from dampening the vigilance of parents in
protecting their own children, lest schools be liable for any
negligence stemming from mistakes in setting up SMP filters
or in carrying out SMP warnings. Fourth, if SMPs prove as
reliable as advertised, school districts in the future may face
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liability for not utilizing such technology to protect their
students. And, finally, schools should take care not to ignore
signs of their technology contractors’ negligence. SMPs
protect students and, to some extent, schools, but schools
need take care lest their adoption of an SMP leads parents
and courts to conclude that, in walking down that path,
schools have become the insurer of student safety.

